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REJECTION OF EXECUTORY CONTRACTS IN
BANKRUPTCY AND REORGANIZATION
LEE SILVERSTEINt
N THE law of secured commercial transactions, one of the hazards
with which a seller or lender must reckon is the possible rejection
of the debtor's executory contracts by the trustee in bankruptcy or
reorganization.
Unfortunately, the law on certain aspects of the power of rejection is
by no means clear. Despite the fact that the power has been recognized
since at least 1794,1 neither the courts nor the learned writers2 have
developed a dear and consistent rationale for its exercise. The courts
have usually been content to allow or disallow the exercise of the power
without exploring its underlying policy basis or bases. The purpose of
this article is to examine the cases and statutes on the power of
rejection so that a consistent and practical theory of the power may be
stated. This approach requires both a historical review of the subject
and a comparison of the present English and American law. Proposals for
amendment of the American law will be made at appropriate places.
The trustee's power of rejection in straight bankruptcy is provided in
section 70b of the Bankruptcy Act,3 which was first adopted in 1938.
Analogous provisions for reorganizations and arrangements appear in
other sections of the act.4 It is generally recognized that all the provisions
t Research attorney, American Bar Foundation. The opinions expressed are the
author's and do not necessarily represent the views of the American Bar Foundation.
1 Bourdillon v. Dalton, 1 Esp. 233, 170 Eng. Rep. 340 (1794).
2 The fullest discussion is in 4 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY §§ 70.43-70.44 (14th ed. 1942,
Supp. 1959). Others are 2 REMINGTON, BANKRUPTCY §§ 852.095, 1141.75 (5th ed. 1956);
Gottesman, The Onus of Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Focus on Vendors and
Lessors, Prac. Law., Apr. 1958, p. 65; Roeder, Landlords, Bankruptcy, and 77B,
23 CoRNn.L L.Q. 285 (1938); Stanley, Leasehold Rights in Bankruptcy and Equity
Proceedings, 29 Ky. L.J. 301 (1941).
3 52 Stat. 879 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 110(b) (Supp. IV, 1963). Former
§ 70b, a part of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, 30 Stat. 562, dealt with a different subject.
4 Railroads: § 77(b), 47 Stat. 1474 (1933), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 205(b) (1958).
Corporate reorganizations under ch. X: §§ 116(1), 216(4), 52 Stat. 885, 895 (1938),
11 U.S.C. §§ 516(1), 616(4) (1958). These provisions are derived from former § 77B(b)(6),
48 Stat. 912 (1934).
Arrangements under ch. XI: §§ 313(1), 357(2), 52 Stat. 906, 910 (1938), 11 U.S.C.
§§ 713(1), 757(2) (1958).
Real estate arrangements under ch. XII: §§ 413(1), 461(4), 52 Stat. 917, 921 (1938),
11 U.S.C. §§ 813(1), 861(4) (1958).
Wage earners' plans under ch. XIII: §§ 613(1), 646(6), 52 Stat. 931, 934 (1938),
11 U.S.C. §§ 1013(1), 1046(6) (1958).
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are largely declaratory of pre-existing case law.5 Comparable provisions
are found in the bankruptcy statutes of England and other common-law
countries and in the commercial codes of civil-law countries.
The power of rejection is an anomaly to contract or property law.
Instead of getting what he bargained for, the disappointed obligee has
only a right to file a claim for damages for breach and to share in such
dividend as there may be after payment of administration expense,
wages, taxes and rent. Where the insolvent debtor is a lessor, his trustee
can reject the lease only to a very limited extent, as explained in section
III hereafter. But to this limited extent the commercial lessee is subject
to uncertainty as to the future.
The power of rejection is a valuable weapon, however, in the armory
of the trustee in protecting the rights of creditors. As such it comple-
ments his power to undo other kinds of transactions and obligations,
namely preferences, fraudulent conveyances, or liens obtained by legal
or equitable proceedings within a prescribed time prior to bankruptcy.
Inevitably these two attitudes are at war with one another.6 The
contract or property interest demands enforcement of the original
transaction whereas the bankruptcy interest demands cancellation of the
bankrupt's obligations, thus freeing his estate to pay a larger dividend to
general creditors. By and large the English and Continental law favor
the contract or property interest, the American law the bankruptcy
interest. In public utility cases, such as a railroad reorganization, a
third interest comes on the field-the public interest.
I. HisTORicAL BACKGROUND
The history of the power of rejection helps explain the law as it
stands today. The earliest reported case is a Lord Mansfield decision in
1794,7 but the opinion indicates that the power of rejection was already
5 HousE COMM. ON THE JuDICIARY, 74th CONG., 2d SEss., ANALYSIS OF H. R. 12889, 227
(Comm. Print 1936); WEINSTEIN, THE BANKRUPTCY LAW OF 1938, A COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS PREPARED FOR THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CREDIT MEN 159-60 (1938);
Gleick, Rent Claims and Security Deposits in Bankruptcy, 18 Mo. L. REv. 1, 9 (1953),
also appearing in 58 CoM. L.J. 181, 184 (1953), 27 REF. J. 43, 44 (1953); McLaughlin,
Amendment of the Bankruptcy Act, 40 HARV. L. REv. 583, 605-06 (1927); Rickles,
Claims Arising From Breach of Executory Contracts, 26 REFa. J. 21 (1952).
6 Cf. Melville, Disclaimer of Contracts in Bankruptcy, 15 MOD. L. REv. 28 (1952), who
points out that there is a "conflict between the principle that a trustee shall respect
existing rights and the policy that, in the administration of an insolvent estate, there
should be a power to throw off onerous liabilities so as to prevent one creditor being
paid in full where others have to be content with a dividend .... "
7 Bourdillon v. Dalton, 1 Esp. 233, 170 Eng. Rep. 340 (1794). Lord Mansfield said
that an assignee in bankruptcy may not be charged with rent unless he has taken
possession, and if he chooses to abandon the premises as burdensome to the estate,
the lease may not be forced upon him.
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familiar at that time. The power almost certainly originated in the law
merchant, the international commercial law of which bankruptcy was a
constituent part. During the fourteenth to sixteenth centuries when the
merchants of various countries mingled at the fairs and markets, such
bankruptcies as occurred were handled by the merchants themselves
in pied poudre fashion. In this setting one can surmise that a practice
developed of permitting a representative of the creditors to abandon
worthless property of the bankrupt so as to speed up liquidation and
distribution of the estate. The courts then moved from abandonment
of a worthless chattel to rejection of an onerous executory contract or
lease.8 Both kinds of property are a burden to the estate. By the time
the first English bankruptcy act was adopted in 1542, 9 the principles of
bankruptcy were well established in the law merchant. English com-
missioners or assignees in bankruptcy were probably applying an
established mercantile custom when they began using the power of
rejection-or disclaimer, as it is called in England. In 1623 another
bankruptcy act provided that the powers of the commissioners should
be construed liberally to help creditors.10 Just as the law merchant was
the source of the British bankruptcy law, so also it was the source of
bankruptcy law on the Continent. Although provisions vary to some
extent, the power of rejection or disclaimer is a common and necessary
principle in modern legal systems."
8 Cf. Note, Abandonment of Assets by a Trustee in Bankruptcy, 53 COLUM. L. RFV.
415 (1953), which classifies unprofitable executory contracts as a kind of property
that should be abandoned. Other kinds are worthless property held by the bankrupt
for sentimental reasons, property that is heavily encumbered and doubtful choses
in action.
9 An Act Against Such Persons as Do Make Bankrupts, 1543, 34 & 35 Hen. 8, c. 4.
See 8 HoLDswoRTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 236 (1926). Coke makes this patriotic
comment (Institutes of the Laws of England, IV, c. 63 (1628)): "We have fetched as
well the name as the wickedness of bankrupts from foreign nations .... In former
times as the name of a bankrupt, so was the offence itself (as has been said) a stranger
to an Englishman, who of all other nations was freest of bankruptcy. And the first
statute that we find against this crime, was indeed made against strangers, viz. against
Lombards, who after they had made obligations to their creditors, suddenly escaped
out of the realm without any agreement made with their creditors .... "
10 An Act for the Further Description of a Bankrupt, and Relief of Creditors
Against such as Shall Become Bankrupts, etc., 1623, 21 Jac. 1, c. 19, § 1. All previous
bankruptcy acts were to be "in all things largely and beneficially construed and
expounded" in the interest of creditors, "for that divers defects are daily found in
the former statutes made against bankrupts, both in the description of a bankrupt,
as also in the power given to the commissioners for the discovery and distributing of
the bankrupt's estate, to the great encouragement of evil-minded persons, the hindrance
of traffic and commerce . . ." and other things tending "to the general hurt of this
realm." The same act, § 7, provided a penalty of two hours in the pillory and loss
of an ear for making a fraudulent conveyance of the value of 20£ or more.
11 On the power of rejection, the German Code has the most detailed provisions.
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The foundation for the modern law of rejection in America was laid
down in the earlier English cases. Although the first comprehensive
English statute on disclaimer was not enacted until 1869,12 the Act of
1809 had dealt with one aspect of disdaimera and the case law had
dealt with other aspects. In several cases the problem was whether the
assignees had shown by their conduct that they intended to adopt a
lease.14 Other cases involved the application of a statutory provision
permitting a bankrupt tenant to terminate his personal liability on the
lease where the assignees failed to elect to disclaim. 15 Still other cases
recognized the power of disclaimer in assignments for the benefit of
creditors as distinguished from bankruptcy. 16 In America the power
made its first appearance in the state courts in the 1840's and 1850's in
Konkursordnung RGBI, 1898 Nr. 25, S. 612, §§ 17-28, translated in 24 COMMERCIAL LAWS
OF THE WoRLD 290 (Scrutton & Bowstead eds. 1912). The Code provides that if a tenant
becomes bankrupt, either the trustee or the landlord may reject the lease. If the land-
lord becomes bankrupt, his trustee may not reject the lease, but if the trustee sells the
property the sale has the same effect as a judicial sale and the purchaser may terminate
the lease. A lessee of movables, however, is entitled to retain them until the end of
the period of lease notwithstanding a sale by the trustee of the lessor.
The Italian Bankruptcy Law of 1942 provides that the trustee may disaffirm only
certain types of contracts, such as a contract for the sale of goods. The obligee of this
kind of contract is not permitted to prove a claim, but a lessor whose lease is rejected
may do so. Riesenfeld, The Evolution of Modern Bankruptcy Law, 31 MINN. L. Rv.
401, 418 (1947).
The French Code has no provision as to adoption or rejection of any form of
agreement except a lease of immovable property (real estate). The Code provides that
the trustee of a lessee may with court permission affirm a lease. CODE DE COMMERCE, art.
450 (Fr. 50th ed. Dalloz 1954). A translation appears in 21 COMMERCIAL LAWS OF THE
WORiD 134 (Scrutton & Bowstead eds. 1912). The courts by the process of decision have
developed flexible administrative rules under this provision. DALLOZ, ENCYCLOPEDrE
JuRwIQuE, 2 Repertoire de Droit Commercial et des Societes §§ 2035-49 (Verge &
Ripert eds. 1957). Similarly, the courts have recognized a power in the trustee to adopt
or reject executory contracts as distinguished from leases. The normal rule in France,
however, much like that in England, is to uphold the obligation of contract insofar
as possible rather than to allow rejection. Id., § 1751. For instance, a coniract provision
is void that provides that bankruptcy ipso facto shall constitute a breach. Id., § 1731.
12 An Act to Consolidate and Amend the Law of Bankruptcy, 1869, 82 & 33 Vict.,
c. 71, § 23.
13 An Act to Alter and Amend the Laws Relating to Bankrupts, 1809, 49 Geo. 3,
c. 121, § 19. This provided that if the assignees in bankruptcy should refuse to accept
a lease of the bankrupt, they would be exonerated from further obligations under the
lease. But the statute also gave the landlord some protection by providing a method by
which he could require the assignees to make a prompt election to accept or disclaim.
14 Wheeler v. Bramah, 3 Camp. 340, 170 Eng. Rep. 1404 (K.B. 1813); Turner v.
Richardson, 7 East. 335, 103 Eng. Rep. 129 (K.B. 1806); Thomas v. Pemberton, 7 Taunt.
206, 129 Eng. Rep. 83 (C.P. 1816).
15 Copeland v. Stephens, 1 Barn. & Ald. 593, 106 Eng. Rep. 218 (K.B. 1818); Tuck
v. Fyson, 6 Bing. 321, 130 Eng. Rep. 1304 (C.P. 1829).
16 Carter v. Warne, 4 Carr. & Payne 191, 172 Eng. Rep. 665 (N.P. 1830); Clark v.
Hume, 1 Ryan & Moody 207, 171 Eng. Rep. 995 (N.P. 1825).
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a variety of kinds of insolvency. 17 It was chiefly in the equity receivership
cases in the federal courts, however, that the power was delineated and
developed. During this formative period from 1840 to 1900, the courts
apparently gave little or no thought to the question of whether the
power of rejection should have different attributes in two contrasting
kinds of cases: (1) Liquidation of the debtor's estate, as in bankruptcy,
assignments for the benefit of creditors and liquidating receiverships;
(2) continued operation and rehabilitation, as in receiverships of rail-
roads and other public utilities. Cases of both kinds were cited indis-
criminately as precedents.' 8 Following the enactment of the present
Bankruptcy Act in 1898, the federal courts, now sitting as courts of
bankruptcy, quite naturally applied the principles of rejection that they
had themselves developed in the equity receivership cases. Rather
sweeping powers to reject leases had been developed in the railroad
receivership cases. (This remedy complemented the authority of the
receiver to pray for reformation of the lease; both remedies being effective
in undoing the chicanery and manipulation that sometimes characterized
nineteenth-century railroad finance.19) But as applied to ordinary
bankruptcy this turned out to be harsh. For example, the landlord
was not allowed to prove damages in bankruptcy for unpaid rent falling
17 Martin v. Black, 9 Paige Ch. 641, 38 Am. Dec. 574 (N.Y. 1842) (equity receiver);
Journeay v. Brackley, 1 Hilt. 447 (N.Y. 1857) (assignment for benefit of creditors);
Rugely & Harrison v. Robinson, 19 Ala. 404 (1851) (Bankruptcy Act of 1841); Streeter
v. Sumner, 31 N.H. 542 (1855) (same); Horwitz v. Davis, 16 Md. 313 (1860) (assignment
for benefit of creditors); Hoyt v. Stoddard, 84 Mass. (2 Allen) 442 (1861) (assignee in
insolvency); Ex parte Houghton, 12 Fed. Cas. No. 6725 (D. Mass. 1871) (the earliest
federal case-Bankruptcy Act of 1867).
18 American File Co. v. Garrett, 110 U.S. 288 (1884) (bankruptcy case citing English
receivership cases); Sunflower Oil Co. v. Wilson, 142 U.S. 313 (1892) (railroad receiver-
ship case citing bankruptcy and receivership cases and a treatise on receivers); Quincy,
Mo. & Pac. R.R. v. Humphreys, 145 U.S. 82 (1892) (same); United States Trust Co. v.
Wabash W. Ry., 150 U.S. 287 (1893) (same); Dushane v. Beall, 161 U.S. 513 (1896) (bank-
ruptcy case citing previous receivership cases decided by same court as well as one
English receivership case and several English bankruptcy cases). The last four cases
became the leading American cases on the power of rejection. See also Stockton v.
Mechanics & Laborers Say. Bank, 32 N.J. Eq. 163, 169 (1880): "The liability of the
receiver in insolvency in such case is precisely the same as that of an assignee in
insolvency or bankruptcy, who may retain or surrender the lease according as it may
seem most advantageous for the estate of the debtor." Other state cases are Wells v.
Hartford Manilla Co., 76 Conn. 27, 55 Atl. 599 (1903) (receivership case involving
rejection of contract for purchase of paper pulp-court cites railroad lease rejection
cases); New Hampshire Trust Co. v. Taggart, 68 N.H. 557, 44 Ad. 751 (1896) (case
involves statutory assignee of insolvent bank--court cites bankruptcy and receivership
cases); Woodruff v. Erie Ry., 93 N.Y. 609 (1883) (receivership citing 1842 New York
receivership case which had relied entirely on English bankruptcy cases).
19 Cf. Grand Rapids Trust Co. v. United Light & Power Co., 7 F. Supp. 511 (W.D.
Mich. 1931); Globe Woolen Co. v. Utica Gas & Elec. Co., 224 N.Y. 483, 491, 121 N.E. 378,
380 (1918); Comment, 33 MicH. L. Rv. 631 (1931).
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due after the date of adjudication.2 0 This rule was altered by statute in
1934.21
The theory of the power of rejection has never really been re-examined
by the courts. From 1898 until the codification of the rejection power
in the amendments of 1933 to 1938,2 the courts merely elaborated on
the received rules. This was partly because most of the cases involved
mere administrative questions, such as how long a time the trustee should
be allowed for making his election, what conduct constituted adoption of
the contract or lease, and what compensation the receiver should pay a
lessor for use and occupancy absent adoption of the lease. After the
amendments of the 1930's most of the cases have turned on questions of
statutory interpretation, often against the background of pre-existing
case law. Again, with rare exceptions, the courts have not examined the
theory of the power of rejection.
II. THEORY AND SCOPE OF THE POWER OF REJECTION
What is the theory of rejection? Does the term "executory contract"
have a special meaning in connection with rejection, a meaning different
from that in the ordinary law of contract? What are the limitations upon
the power of rejection as developed by the courts and as prescribed by
statute? Is there any difference in the application of the power of
rejection as between leases and other kinds of executory contracts?
The courts and writers usually state that the trustee in bankruptcy
need not accept as part of the bankrupt's estate any property which is
onerous or burdensome, since to do so would diminish rather than
augment the estate available for distribution to creditors.23 In the older
cases a typical form of onerous property was the unfavorable leasehold
owned by the bankrupt lessee. By about 1890, the courts were applying
20 MAcLACHLAN, BANKRUPTCY 127 (1956). For discussions of some of the difficulties
under the prior law, see Douglas & Frank, Landlords' Claims in Reorganization, 42
YALE L.J. 1003 (1933). The former federal rule still obtains in some state courts. E.g.,
People ex rel. Nelson v. West Town State Bank, 373 Ill. 106, 25 N.E.2d 509 (1940).
21 Bankruptcy Act § 4a, 48 Stat. 923 (1934), amending the Bankruptcy Act § 63a,
30 Stat. 562 (1898).
22 See note 4 supra.
23 Dushane v. Beall, 161 U.S. 513, 515 (1896); Glenny v. Langdon, 98 U.S. 20, 30 (1878);
White v. Griffing, 44 Conn. 437 (1877); Streeter v. Sumner, 31 N.H. 542 (1855); BLACK,
BANKRUPTCY 683 (3d ed. 1922); 4 CoLLImR, BANKRUPTCY 1332 (14th ed. 1942, Supp. 1959);
RoBsoN, BANKRUPTCY 323 (1872). Some of the older cases suggest as an additional
element making for rejectability, the oppressiveness or unfairness of a contract, some-
times verging on illegality or violation of public policy, but these cases smack of
rescission rather than rejection. Sunflower Oil Co. v. Wilson, 142 U.S. 313, 322, 325
(1892); Express Co. v. Railway Co., 99 U.S. 191 (1878); Ellis v. Boston, H. & E.R.R., 107
Mass. 1 (1871); cf. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Smith, 184 Fed. 1 (1st Cir. 1911). See GLUCK
& BEcm, RiEctms OF CORPORATIONS 316-19 (2d ed. 1896).
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the same rule to onerous choses in action. With the rise of modem
methods of distribution and finance and the vast growth of intangible
forms of wealth, difficult problems in the application of the power of
rejection have presented themselves to the courts, problems involving
executory contracts unrelated to land. At the same time problems
involving leaseholds still require solution.
As Lord Ellenborough declared in an early English case,
[A]ssignees of a bankrupt are not bound to take ... property of
the bankrupt, which so far from being valuable would be a
charge to the creditors; but they may make their election: if,
however, they elect to take the property, they cannot afterwards
renounce it because it turns out to be a bad bargain .... 24
This principle of a binding election still applies with full rigor. The
converse also holds true: Once the trustee rejects a contract, he cannot
afterwards adopt it. In reorganization, however, as distinguished from
bankruptcy, the principle of a binding election has been modified.
In both bankuptcy and receivership cases decided before the amend-
ments of the 1930's, the trustee or receiver was allowed a reasonable time
within which to make his election. 25 Long periods were often permitted.
Meanwhile, the other party could bring pressure on the trustee or
receiver only by the cumbersome remedy of asking the court to require
him to make his election. 26 This unsatisfactory procedure led to the
adoption in 1938 of the sixty-day provision of section 70b which required
a prompt election, except where the court allowed an extension of time.2 7
Inaction by the trustee is automatically a rejection. Thus uncertainty
and delay, formerly the bane of creditors, are now kept to a minimum.
In reorganization, however, the statutory provisions are less strict, and
the courts have tended to interpret them in such a way as to revert to
the older rule. The statute itself provides that a trustee in a chapter X
reorganization can reject an executory contract as in straight bankruptcy;
24 Turner v. Richardson, 7 East. 335, 342, 103 Eng. Rep. 129, 132 (K.B. 1806).
25 Dushane v. Beall, 161 U.S. 513, 515 (1896); Sunflower Oil Co. v. Wilson, 142 U.S.
313, 322 (1892); Sparhawk v. Yerkes, 142 U.S. 1 (1891); Pacific W. Oil Co. v. McDuffie,
69 F.2d 208 (9th Cir. 1934); Butterworth v. Degnon Contracting Co., 214 Fed. 772 (2d
Cir. 1914); In re Frazin, 183 Fed. 28 (2d Cir. 1910).
26 In Samuels v. E.F. Drew & Co., 292 Fed. 734, 739 (2d Cir. 1923), the court
recognized the hardship that this rule imposed on a seller of coconut oil, the price
of which was subject to market fluctuation.
27 As adopted in 1938, § 70b provided: "Within sixty days after the adjudication,
the trustee shall assume or reject any executory contract, including unexpired leases
of real property: Provided, however, That the court may for cause shown extend or
reduce such period of time .... " Bankruptcy Act § 70b, 52 Stat. 880 (1938). For the
1962 amended version, see note 123 infra.
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but another section says that, in addition, the plan of reorganization,
which follows at a later time, may also allow for rejection of executory
contracts.28 Thus it appears from reading these two sections together that
the trustee has two turns at bat.28a He may either reject promptly, as in
straight bankruptcy, or may reject later as part of the plan of reorganiza-
tion. In effect this either allows the trustee a very long "reasonable time"
for his election, or else allows him to first assume the contract and later
reject it. The courts have confirmed this interpretation by ruling that
the sixty-day limit of section 70b does not apply to chapter X.29
Bankruptcy ipso facto disables the bankrupt from performing most of
his contracts since he loses control of his assets. The trustee, upon his
appointment and qualification, is vested by operation of law with the
bankrupt's title to property as of the date the petition was filed.3 0 In a
strict sense it may be said that the trustee should affirm or reject all
the contracts of the bankrupt that he has not fully performed. Yet in
practice the power of rejection is applied only to certain kinds of
executory contracts.
Several different fact situations may be defined:
(1) Upon adjudication of bankruptcy, the debtor's only executory
duty is to pay money for goods or services purchased on open account,
and the creditor has fully performed. In this very common situation, the
trustee usually does not need to reject the contract, even though it is
executory on the side of the bankrupt. This is because the creditor
understands when he receives his notice of the bankruptcy that the
bankrupt will not be able to pay the account. To require the trustee to
reject all such contracts would unduly burden him with an insignificant
detail. It would also add unduly to the cost of administration of
bankruptcies. Moreover, if the trustee fails to notify the creditor, he is
not left in doubt for long: Under section 70b the trustee must act
28 Bankruptcy Act §§ 116(l), 216(4), 52 Stat. 885, 896 (1938), 11 U.S.C. §§ 516(1),
616(4) (1958). See note 4 supra, for citation to parallel sections in other chapters of
the Act.
28a But see In re Davega Stores Corp., CCH BANKR. L. REP. 60777 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
A trustee renegotiated a lease, got a lower rent in a chapter XI proceeding and had it
confirmed by the court. Then when the proceeding was changed to chapter X, the
trustee tried to reject the lease. Held, rejection denied.
29 See discussion in text at notes 127-29 infra.
30 Bankruptcy Act § 70a, 52 Stat. 879 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 110(a) (1958). A special
provision governs transactions that occur after the filing of a petition but before the
bankrupt has given up physical possession of the assets. Bankruptcy Act § 70d, 52 Stat.
881 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 110(d) (1958). In England, the title of the trustee relates back
to the time of the act of bankruptcy upon which a receiving order is entered against
the bankrupt. Bankruptcy Act, 1914, 4 & 5 Geo. 5, c. 59, § 37. The filing of a voluntary
petition is deemed an act of bankruptcy for the purpose of vesting of title in the
trustee. Bankruptcy Act, 1914, 4 & 5 Geo. 5, c. 59, § 37.
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within a specified time period, and failure to act is deemed a rejection.
Furthermore, if the trustee assumed one or more such contracts without
assuming them all, he would be favoring such creditors over others in
violation of the Bankruptcy Act.31 Hence neither trustees nor experienced
creditors think in terms of even a possible assumption of such contracts.32
(2) The contract of the bankrupt is to sell goods rather than buy
them, and at the time of adjudication the other party has fully per-
formed, as by paying in advance of delivery. If the bankrupt has
sufficiently appropriated or identified the goods to the contract,33 the
buyer is entitled to possession against the trustee, a right that is enforce-
able by a petition for reclamation if the trustee should reject.3 4 This
result may be justified on either of two theories: (a) The goods were not
the property of the bankrupt at the time of adjudication, or (b) the
contract was no longer executory at that time. If the goods have not
been sufficiently appropriated or identified to the contract, the buyer is
not entitled to the goods as against the trustee. This is the property
theory applied the opposite way. As an alternative the trustee can
reject the contract as executory. Either action by the trustee-resistance
of the reclamation petition or rejection of the contract-leaves the
creditor to a common claim for damages for breach of contract. The
trustee's decision to reject should be based on three factors: contract
price, market price and the relation of the assets in the estate of the
bankrupt free for common creditors to the total of the claims of common
creditors. Thus, even where the market price is fifty per cent below the
contract price, where there are no other assets and many outstanding
claims the trustee should reject and sell the goods at market. This will
bring that much additional cash into the estate. The buyer who has
prepaid will still have a claim for the entire amount paid but must share
with other general creditors in the proceeds of the sale. The mere
circumstance that the buyer has paid in advance does not of itself
entitle him to any advantage relative to other unsecured creditors. He
has parted with cash; they have furnished goods or services; but all
must share pro rata in the common calamity of the debtor's failure.
(3) If the bankrupt himself has fully performed a contract but the
other party has not, the contract is usually an asset of the estate rather
than a possible burden. In this category are such things as the bank-
31 Bankruptcy Act §§ 65a, e, 52 Stat. 875 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 105(a), (e) (1958).
32 On the meaning of "executory" in § 70b, compare the discussion in 4 COLLIER,
BANKRUPTCY 1350-51 (14th ed. 1942, Supp. 1959).
33 UNIFORM SALES Acr, §§ 15, 17; UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, § 2-501; see
2 WILLISTON, SALES § 258 (rev. ed. 1948).
34 See McGann v. Capital Sav. Bank & Trust Co., 117 Vt. 179, 89 A.2d 128 (1952).
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rupt's accounts receivable. The principle of rejection does not apply
here because it is limited to burdensome assets. One may be tempted to
deduce a general proposition that a contract may be rejected only if
executory upon the part of the bankrupt and not on the part of the
other party.3 5 But this formula will not fit all situations. For example,
it will not fit the three-party arrangement where a lender finances the
sale.386
(4) The bankrupt owes money and the creditor holds a security in-
terest. If the creditor has completed performance by delivering the goods
or advancing the loan funds, the contract is executory only on the side
of the bankrupt. This fact situation may appear to be the same as the
first, but the existence of the security interest changes the picture. If
the trustee permits automatic rejection by failing to elect promptly, he
may cause the estate to lose a- valuable asset, e.g., a conditional sale
contract that has been almost fully paid out.37 The same thing can hap-
pen where the creditor is a lessor and the bankrupt a lessee in default.3 8
If the trustee should assume a conditional sale contract and later default
in the payments, the creditor could of course enforce his remedies against
the trustee, including reclamation of the goods. Where the unpaid bal-
ance on a conditional sale contract equals or exceeds the value of the
35 In In re Pagliaro, 99 F. Supp. 548 (S.D. Cal. 1951), aff'd sub nom. Costello v.
Golden, 196 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir. 1962), the trustee argued that executory meant executory
on both sides, but the court held that it -meant executory only on the part of the bank-
rupt, citing 4 COLLIm, BANKRUPTCY 1228-29 (14th ed. 1942).
36 See In re Italian Cook Oil Corp., 190 F.2d 994 (3d Cir. 1951).
37 In the Matter of Forgee Metal Prods., Inc., 229 F.2d 799 (3d Cir. 1956) (trustee
assumed conditional sale contract but failed to notify vendor, hence vendor could
reclaim the goods); In the Matter of McCormick Lumber & Mfg. Corp., 144 F. Supp.
804 (D. Ore. 1956) (trustee did not clearly assume conditional sale contract for sawmill
equipment purchased by bankrupt, but since vendor failed to seek reclamation, trustee
was entitled to surplus proceeds of sale after paying off balance due vendor on the
contract); In re Pagliaro, 99 F. Supp. 548 (S.D. Cal. 1951), aff'd sub nom. Costello
v. Golden, 196 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir. 1952) (trustee was deemed to have rejected condi-
tional sale contract of bankrupt vendee by failure to adopt it within the statutory
period).
38 In re Northern Ind. Oil Co., 180 F.2d 669 (7th Cir. 1950) (trustee abandoned
leases by failing to adopt them within statutory period); accord, In the Matter of
Gravure Paper & Board Corp., 234 F.2d 928 (3d Cir. 1956). But cf. Texas & N.O.R.R.
v. Phillips, 196 F.2d 692 (5th Cir. 1952) (court permitted trustee of bankrupt tenant
an extension of time, apparently within sixty-day period, but landlord was not
notified of the extension; trustee later adopted lease and landlord objected that trustee
had previously abandoned lease by inaction, but court upheld trustee); In the Matter
of Morrison-Barnhart Motors, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 845 (N.D. Ohio 1956) (although trustee
of bankrupt tenant failed to adopt lease within sixty days, court held he had not in-
tended to abandon it, hence landlord who sold the premises within the sixty-day period
without notifying court or trustee must pay the trustee surplus funds previously
deposited by tenant with landlord as security for rent).
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property being purchased, the trustee should reject it. The secured
creditor then files a petition to reclaim the property from the estate, or
repossesses it in pais.39 If the property does not satisfy his claim, he also
files as an unsecured creditor for the balance. Sometimes the trustee will
accomplish the same result by petitioning to abandon the liened property
as having no value to the estate.
The rejection power cannot be used to wipe out a security interest.
In a reorganization suit where the trustee was seeking to reject the
security agreement rather than the debtor's duties under an executory
contract, the court denied rejection, stating that the contract was not
executory.40 It is better to say that the power of rejection may not be
used to destroy an otherwise valid security interest.41 A security interest
may in proper cases be attacked as a preference 42 or a fraudulent con-
39 In the Matter of Forgee Metal Prods., Inc., 229 F.2d 779 (3d Cir. 1956); In the
Matter of McCormick Lumber & Mfg. Corp., 144 F. Supp. 804 (D. Ore. 1956); In re
Pagliaro, 99 F. Supp. 548 (S.D. Cal. 1951), af'd sub nom. Costello v. Golden, 196 F.2d
1017 (9th Cir. 1952). See generally 5A REMINGTON, BANKRUPrCY ch. 36, pt. 5 (5th ed.
1953); COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY MANUAL 70.24 (5th ed. 1962).
40 In re H. K. Porter Co., 24 F. Supp. 766 (W.D. Pa. 1938) (trustee in § 77B reorgani-
zation sought to reject debtor's assignment to lessor of future rents of sublessees as
additional security for debtor's payment of rent under head lease). Contra, United
Elec. Sec. Co. v. Louisiana Elec. Light Co., 71 Fed. 615 (E.D. La. 1896), aff'd sub nom.
General Elec. Co. v. Whitney, 74 Fed. 664 (5th Cir. 1896) (court permitted receiver of
power company to reject contract assigning future proceeds of sale of power; court
said assignment contract was executory). But cf. In re Italian Cook Oil Corp., 190 F.2d
994 (3d Cir. 1951) (trustees in ch. X reorganization petitioned to reject debtor's assign-
ment to bank of expected proceeds from contract to sell mayonnaise; at time of
petition, trustees had gone ahead with manufacture and delivery of mayonnaise, hence
court ruled that this amounted to assumption of assignment contract); In the Matter of
Swindle, 188 F. Supp. 601 (D. Ore. 1960) (trustee petitioned to adopt contract for
purchase of real estate without adoption of subsequent modification of escrow terms
requiring additional payment; court ruled trustee must adopt contract in entirety or
not at all).
41 Compare the special provisions that have been inserted in the corporate reorgani-
zation sections of the Bankruptcy Act to permit repossession by the lessor or con-
ditional vendor of railroad rolling stock and equipment, 49 Stat. 911 (1936), 11 U.S.C.
§ 205(j) (1958), or by the conditional vendor of commercial airplanes, 71 Stat. 617
(1957), 11 U.S.C. § 516(5) (1958). The latter provision does not apply to chattel
mortgages. See Adkins & Billyou, Developments in Commercial Aircraft Equipment
Financing, 13 Bus. LAw. 199, 208-12 (1958).
42 Bankruptcy Act § 60, 52 Stat. 869 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 96 (1958). The power of
rejection relates to prospective future performance, whereas the power to avoid a
preference, a fraudulent conveyance, or a lien obtained by legal or equitable pro-
ceedings usually relates to transactions or events that are faits accomplis at the time
of adjudication. The trustee uses the power of rejec :on to preserve assets that pass
to him upon adjudication by rejecting burdensome executory contracts that would
impair these assets. He uses the other powers to recover for the estate assets that have
previously been transferred or subjected to liens.
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veyance43 but not as a burdensome executory contract. The shielding
of secured creditors from rejection is justified because unsecured creditors
have notice of the lien through recordation or filing.
A possible exception to the foregoing discussion is the executory con-
tract for the sale of real estate where the vendee deposits money with
the vendor before the latter is adjudicated bankrupt. In this situation,
the vendee, absent bankruptcy, has an enforceable equitable lien on the
land, at least if the contract provides that a lien is created and if the
contract is then recorded.4 4 In England the lien is enforceable against
the trustee in bankruptcy, 45 the remedy being either specific performance
of the contract or a refund of the amount paid. There is some American
support for this view.6 But the federal court for the Southern District
of New York has ruled that the vendee's remedy is limited to a refund
of the amount paid, with no right of specific performance.4 7 Perhaps
these opposing views can best be reconciled by a compromise rule. In
cases of unusual hardship on the vendee, as where no comparable real
estate is obtainable, the court could deny rejection on condition that
the vendee agree to a higher purchase price. This kind of order would
operate on the same principle as readjustment of an executory lease as
proposed in section III, infra. One may ask why the vendee of realty
should be treated better than the vendee of personalty. The answer is
that real property is unique but personalty usually is not-and if it is,
the realty rule should apply.
(5) The power of rejection does not apply to money or property
held by the bankrupt in escrow or trust for another party, even though
the escrow or trust agreement may be partly executory at the time of
bankruptcy.48 This is because the property held in escrow or trust is
43 Bankruptcy Act §§ 67, 70c, e, 52 Stat. 875, 881, 882 (1938), 11 U.S.C. §§ 107,
110(c), (e) (1958). See MACLACHLAN, BANKRUPTCY ch. 21 (1956).
44 If the vendee fails to protect himself in this way, and if the vendor mingles the
cash deposit with other funds so that the proceeds cannot be traced, the vendee is
reduced to the status of a common creditor. Compare text at note 48 infra.
45 In re Bastable, [1901] 2 K.B. 518 (C.A.); Pearce v. Bastable's Trustee, [1901]
2 Ch. 122; cf. Ex parte Holthausen, L.R. 9 Ch. 722, 726 (1874).
46 Lathrop v. Specht, 186 Iowa 225, 172 N.W. 296 (1919) (assignment for benefit of
creditors-strong dictum); Note, Effect of Bankruptcy on Realty Contracts, 6 TExAs
L. REv. 358 (1928).
47 Matter of New York Investors Mut. Group, Inc., 143 F. Supp. 51 (S.D.N.Y.
1956); cf. In re Philadelphia Penn Worsted Co., 278 F.2d 661 (3d Cir. 1960) (trustee
could reject because under Pennsylvania law, a contract for sale of land is executory
until deed is delivered; query, whether "executory" should have same meaning in
bankruptcy law as in general contract law); Central Trust Co. v. East Tenn. Land Co.,
79 Fed. 19 (E.D. Tenn. 1897) (specific performance denied in equity receivership case).
48 Gulf Petroleum, S. A. v. Collazo, 316 F.2d 257 (Ist Cir. 1963); American Serv. Co. v.
Henderson, 120 F.2d 525, 531 (4th Cir. 1941).
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regarded as belonging to the other party. If money held in escrow is
commingled with other assets, so that it can no longer be traced, the
depositor is reduced to the status of a common creditor.4 9
(6) Can a debtor reject a floating lien held by a creditor? No cases
have been found on this point. As to chattels or receivables to which the
lien has already attached at the time of adjudication, the contract should
be non-rejectable, for the reasons advanced in discussing the fourth
hypothetical situation. As to chattels or receivables to which the lien
has not attached at that time, it would seem that the lien is cut off
by the trustee's prior lien under section 70c, hence the contract need
not be rejected. Firms that lend on this kind of security usually protect
themselves by advancing funds only when their lien is perfected, so the
problem is not likely to arise often. Conceivably, in a reorganization a
trustee might affirm such a security contract and continue to use this
method of financing.
(7) A lessee bankrupt's unexpired lease may be rejected as an executory
contract. Indeed, history shows that the unexpired lease is the archetype
of the rejectable contract. Moreover, section 70b refers specifically to
unexpired leases. If the trustee fails to act promptly and unequivocally,
his inaction may be construed as failure to assume a favorable lease,50
since inaction constitutes rejection.
Where the lessor rather than the lessee is in bankruptcy, section 70b
permits rejection but provides that it "shall not deprive the lessee of
his estate." This limitation on the power of rejection is explored in
section III hereafter. Leases are compared with other executory con-
tracts at the end of the present section.
(8) The contract, other than a secured transaction, that calls for
continuing performance upon both sides is more important in reor-
ganizations than in straight bankruptcies. Examples are contracts for
the development of a shopping center,51 the manufacture of goods for
order,52 the purchase of goods,53 the carriage of freight by rail 54 or cargo
49 Gulf Petroleum, S. A. v. Collazo, 816 F.2d 257 (lst Cir. 1963).
50 See cases cited note 38 supra.
51 Workman v. Harrison, 282 F.2d 693 (10th Cir. 1960).
52 Brandenburg v. Coxe, 228 Pa. 212, 77 Adt. 455 (1910); Harrigan v. Gilchrist, 121
Wis. 127, 99 N.W. 909 (1904).
53 Pacific W. Oil Co. v. McDuffie, 69 F.2d 208 (9th Cir. 1934); Samuels v. E.F.
Drew & Co., 286 Fed. 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1922), aff'd, 292 Fed. 734 (2d Cir. 1923); Menke
v. Willcox, 275 Fed. 57 (S.D.N.Y. 1021); Wells v. Hartford Manilla Co., 76 Conn. 27, 55
Ad. 599 (1903); cf. In re M & S Amusement Enterprises, Inc., 122 F. Supp. 364 (D. Del.
1954) (trustee in reorganization of open-air movie corporation rejected unfavorable
concession contract with candy vending company).
54 Express Co. v. Railway Co., 99 U.S. 191 (1878); Ellis v. Boston, H. & E.R.R.,
107 Mass. 1 (1871).
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by water,55 or the supplying of electric power. 56 The trustee in reor-
ganization has a reasonable time to decide whether to adopt or reject
the contract. 57 He is under a duty to perform a contract that is favorable
to the estate.58
The power of rejection is coordinated with the principal purpose
of a reorganization proceeding-rehabilitation and continued operation
of the debtor. If the trustee accepts the benefits of such a contract, then
seeks to reject it after the other party has fully performed, rejection will
be denied.59 An election to adopt the contract is imputed to the trustee.
If, however, the contract is one requiring continuing performance on
both sides, such as those mentioned above, the trustee in reorganization
might originally affirm the contract, but upon finding it burdensome
later, reject it then as part of the plan of reorganization. 60
(9) The bankrupt licensee of a patent, copyright or trademark usually
has an executory duty to pay royalties and the licensor has an executory
duty not to license other persons. Although one might suppose that a
trustee in bankruptcy can reject such a contract since it is executory
on both sides, the American cases most nearly in point have implied
that it is not rejectable. The leading case is In re Waterson, Berlin &
Snyder Co.61 In this case a composer assigned to a publishing house the
55 Butterworth v. Degnon Contracting Co., 214 Fed. 772 (2d Cir. 1914); In re
Rochester Shipbuilding Corp., 32 F. Supp. 98 (W.D.N.Y. 1940).
56 Consolidated Gas, Elec. Light & Power Co. v. United Rys. & Elec. Co., 85 F.2d 799
(4th Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 300 U.S. 663 (1937).
57 See text accompanying notes 25-29 supra.
58 Butterworth v. Degnon Contracting Co., 214 Fed. 772 (2d Cir. 1914); Harrigan
v. Gilchrist, 121 Wis. 127, 352-53, 99 N.W. 909, 978 (1904); In re Great Cobar, Ltd.,
[1915] 1 Ch. 682; In re Newdigate Colliery, Ltd., [1912] 1 Ch. 468; In re Thames Iron-
works, Shipbuilding & Eng'r Co., [1912] Weekly N. 56. See Note, Abandonment of
Assets by a Trustee in Bankruptcy, 53 CoLum. L. Rav. 415, 418 (1953). Compare the
rule of business judgment established by the Supreme Court in railroad reorganization
cases. Group of Institutional Investors v. Chicago, M., St. P. & Pac. R.R., 318 U.S. 523,
549-51 (1943). See note 135 infra.
59 In re Italian Cook Oil Corp., 190 F.2d 994 (3d Cir. 1951) (see note 40 supra);
Spencer v. World's Columbian Exposition, 163 Ill. 117, 45 N.E. 250 (1896) (receiver
who operated clambake concession thereby adopted lease); In re San Francisco Bay
Exposition, 50 F. Supp. 344 (N.D. Cal. 1943) (receiver of insolvent building and loan
association attempted to reject contract to subscribe funds to Exposition, which was
itself in ch. XI arrangement; court declared that contract was not executory because
Exposition had fully performed its side of contract: "Granted the power to disaffirm,
it amounts to a breach and gives rise to the right to recover damages on the part of
the injured party; since the measure of damages for failure to pay money is equal to
the amount that should have been paid, the right of disaffirmance is illusory....
I conclude that this is not the type of executory contract, which is subject to dis-
affirmance under the statute." Id. at 347).
60 See text accompanying notes 28-29 supra.
61 48 F.2d 704 (2d Cir. 1931); 45 HARv. L. REv. 586 (1932). See Chafee, Equitable
Servitudes on Chattels, 41 HAxv. L. Rav. 945 (1928).
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right to copyright his composition and market it in exchange for pay-
ment of royalties. Upon the bankruptcy of the publisher the composer
sought to rescind the contract since the publisher could no longer per-
form, while the trustee sought to sell the copyright free and dear of the
bankrupt's duty to pay royalties. This was in effect an attempt to reject
the contract. The court ruled that the composer was entitled to an
equitable lien but not to the more generous remedy of rescission. Thus
the trustee was required to sell the copyright subject to the agreement
or servitude to pay royalties. The same rule has been applied in cases
involving patented fountain pens62 and phonograph records, 63 a copy-
righted law book,64 and the trade mark and good will of soap products.65
Cases might arise from the licensing of the right to show old movies on
television. 66 And where a trustee sold patented electric razors and parts,
the licensor was held to be entitled to prove a claim against the estate
for infringement; moreover, this claim was recognized as an administra-
tion expense, entitled to first priority.67 Although the power of rejection
as such was not discussed in these cases, to recognize the right of the
author or inventor to royalties is to deny the trustee's power of rejection.
If the agreement between the copyright owner and the debtor constitutes
an assignment, it must be recorded to be effective against the trustee's
lien under section 70c.68 Here the recordation is notice of the assignor's
ownership of intangible personal property in the debtor's possession,
as is recordation in real property law. Hence, if the recordation is timely,
the assignor has a status similar to that of a secured creditor as in the
fourth hypothetical. But suppose the assignment is merely of the right
to obtain a copyright, as in the Waterson case, or suppose it is an
agreement that does not ordinarily require recordation. May the trustee
use his power to reject under section 70b, or his power as a lienholder
under section 70c, or both, to take possession of the assignor's interest,
thereby relegating him to a mere claim against the estate for damages?
62 In re S. Spitzel & Co., 168 Fed. 156 (E.D.N.Y. 1909).
63 Kenyon v. Automatic Instrument Co., 160 F.2d 878 (6th Cir. 1947) (where receiver
of insolvent corporation sold patents that corporation held as licensee, court declared
purchaser liable to licensor's survivor for value of use of patents).
64 In re Law Book Co., 239 App. Div. 363, 267 N.Y.S. 169 (1933) (assignment for
benefit of creditors); cf. Berry v. Hoffman, 125 Pa. Super. 261, 189 At. 516 (1937).
65 In re Tidy House Prods. Co., 79 F. Supp. 674 (S.D. Iowa 1948).
66 See United Artists Corp. v. Strand Prods., Inc., 216 F.2d 305 (9th Cir. 1954).
67 In re Progress Lektro Shave Corp., 35 F. Supp. 915 (D. Conn. 1940).
68 Assignments of copyrights are void as against bona fide purchasers or subsequent
lienholders unless recorded in the Copyright Office within three -months of the assign-
ment or six months for assignments made outside the United States. 17 U.S.C. § 30
(1958). Similar provisions apply to patents, 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1958), and to trademarks,
60 Stat. 431, 15 U.S.C. § 1060 (1958).
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Waterson indicates that the power of rejection may not be used in this
way: The equitable lien of the composer prevails over the rights of the
trustee. And even if the trustee can show that the assignor's interest is
the kind of property upon which a creditor of the bankrupt "could have
obtained a lien by legal or equitable proceedings at the date of bank-
ruptcy .... " the Waterson line of cases seem to imply that section 70c
should not be applicable. 69 This special treatment accorded creative
forms of property may result from the judicially created policy of pro-
tection and encouragement of creative genius. Just as creative efforts are
encouraged by granting a monopoly for years under the patent and
copyright laws, so business transactions entered into by creative persons
for the promotion of their creations are entitled to greater security
than are ordinary transactions when bankruptcy supervenes.
(10) The bankrupt is the vendor of chattels that are being specially
manufactured for the vendee 70 or that are otherwise unique.71 The
proper test for rejection here is whether the performance of the contract
would harm other creditors of the bankrupt.7 2 If performance would
merely substitute cash for chattels in the estate, the contract should be
non-rejectable. On the same principle, the vendee is entitled to specific
performance. If the performance of the contract would, however, reduce
the general estate available to creditors, rejection is proper. In cases
of unusual hardship on the vendee, it might be proper for the court to
deny rejection on condition that the vendee agree to a higher pur-
chase price. This kind of order would operate on the same principle as
readjustment of an executory lease as proposed in section III. It is
useful to compare the treatment of an executory contract for sale of
unique chattels with an executory contract for sale of real estate.73 The
two situations should be handled consistently.
(11) In reorganizations involving public utilities, the court may refuse
rejection because of a countervailing public policy.74 For example, the
69 At the time of the Waterson decision, the comparable provision was found in
§ 47a(2), which had been enacted in 1910.
70 Hurley v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 215 U.S. 126 (1909).
71 See the cases collected in 5 CORBIn, CONTRACrS §§ 1146, 1156 (1951); CHAF-E & RE,
EQurrY 171-207 (4th ed. 1958).
72 See the illuminating discussion in Horack, Insolvency and Specific Performance,
31 HARv. L. REv. 702 (1918).
73 See text accompanying notes 45-47 supra.
74 In Birmingham Trust & Sav. Co. v. Atlanta, B. & A. Ry., 271 Fed. 731 (NJ). Ga.
1921), the court held it improper for a railroad receiver to reduce wages payable
under employment contracts, since to do so would violate a requirement of notice
and hearing prescribed in the Newlands Act. In Ottenheimer v. Whitaker, 198 F.2d
289 (4th Cir. 1952), the court refused to allow the trustee to abandon three worthless
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trustee of a railroad in reorganization may not reject a contract with
another line for use of a track or trestle without obtaining the permission
of the Interstate Commerce Commission to abandon the service in-
volved.75 And in a chapter X reorganization, the trustee may not reject
a contract in the public authority, such as a contract between a transit
company in reorganization and a city, whereby the company is to operate
transit lines owned by the city.7 6
Thus, rejection will be allowed only if the contract is executory as to at
least one party, usually the bankrupt or debtor in reorganization, and
only if performance would be burdensome or unprofitable to the estate.
Nevertheless, the power of rejection cannot be used to destroy an other-
wise valid security interest, the estate of a lessee, the equitable interest
of the owner of creative property, or, in some instances, the equity of
the vendee of real estate or unique chattels. Nor may the trustee reject
a public utility contract if to do so would contravene an important public
policy.
The foregoing statement of the principle of rejection tends to obviate
the problem of deciding when the. contract is no longer executory, 77
and avoids the rigid rule that the contract must be executory as to the
bankrupt or debtor.7 8
barges that would probably have sunk in Baltimore harbor, thus obstructing naviga-
tion. See 13 MD. L. REv. 229 (1953).
75 Thompson v. Texas Mex. Ry., 328 U.S. 134 (1946); Gaston v. Rutland R.R.,
35 F.2d 685 (2d Cir. 1929), cert. denied, 281 U.S. 728 (1930); cf. Smith v. Hoboken R.R.,
Warehouse & S.S. Co., 328 U.S. 123 (1946).
76 This provision was in old § 77B(c)(6) but was omitted in the Chandler Act, H.R.
8046, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937), as passed by the House, apparently because it was
thought to be covered by other provisions in the act or by general principles of case
law. The Senate inserted the public authority exception, apparently upon the basis
of a letter from Mayor LaGuardia and of statements by Rep. Celler and others.
Hearings on H.R. 8046 Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, 75th Cong., 2d Sess. 171-99 (1938) (especially statement of Weinstein at
197). See also S. REP. No. 1916, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 6 (1938); Gerdes, Section 77B, The
Chandler Bill and Other Proposed Revisions, 35 MIcH. L. REv. 361, 397 (1937). But a
trustee of a municipal transit company may reject the lease of a branch line despite
the lessor's argument that it is a contract in the public authority. In re Chicago
Rapid Transit Co., 129 F.2d (7th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Chicago Junction R.R. v.
Sprague, 317 U.S. 683 (1942).
77 See In re H.K. Porter Co., 24 F. Supp. 766 (W.D. Pa. 1938) (see note 40 supra).
Must the contract be executory as to both the bankrupt and the creditor? Suppose
a third party holding a security interest is involved, as in In re Italian Cook Oil Corp.,
190 F.2d 994 (3d Cir. 1951) (see note 40 supra). Must the contract be executory as to all
three parties? If the debtor has made an assignment of future rents or other accounts
receivable, has he completed his performance? Questions such as these baffle analysis
in terms of when the contract is executory.
78 In re Pagliaro, 99 F. Supp. 548 (N.D. Cal. 1951), aff'd sub nom. Costello v. Golden,
196 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir. 1952); In re San Francisco Bay Exposition, 50 F. Supp. 344
(N.D. Cal. 1943).
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III. LESSOR IN BANKRUPTCY OR REORGANIZATION
Under the principle of rejection is a lease different from other kinds
of executory contracts? Rejection first appeared in cases of bankrupt
lessees; the first reported case involving a bankrupt lessor came much
later. Although a leasehold has, for historical reasons, been regarded as
personal rather than real property,79 historical distinctions make little
sense in the modem commercial world where the lease often does the
work of the contract or where a lease and a contract are used together
for a single business arrangement8 0 Moreover, the modem lease plays
many roles: The nonrenewable long-term lease resembles a mortgage;
the renewable long-term lease is tantamount to a grant of the fee; the
medium-term lease with option to purchase is like a purchase contract;
the shopping-center lease is used to control the development and use
of land, much like restrictive covenants in grants of the fee; still other
purposes are served by the sale and lease back, the leased department
in a retail store and the proprietary leasehold. 8' Where the modern
lease is like a transaction in personalty, it ought to be subject to the same
risks. In some situations, however, it is socially desirable that the lessee
have a high degree of assurance that his possession will not be inter-
rupted by lessor bankruptcy. The lessee with a large investment in
equipment, inventory and good will, for instance, has a legitimate claim
to greater protection than the ordinary unsecured creditor. But the law
on this point remains uncertain.
Section 70b of the Chandler Act of 1938, as amended in 1962, includes
the following provision:
Unless a lease of real property expressly otherwise provides, a
rejection of the lease or of any covenant therein by the trustee
of the lessor does not deprive the lessee of his estate.8 2
This may be called the lessor provision and its purpose is to limit the
trustee's power of rejection. But is it declaratory of pre-existing law or
does it afford to lessees some new protection not previously available?
*What, precisely, is the content of the lessee's "estate"?-Is it the sum
of the rights arising from the lessor's covenants in the lease, or merely
79 1 CASNER, AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY 175-78 (1952).
80 Id. at 202-05. See generally CLARK, REAL COVENANTS AND OTHER INTERESTS WHICH
"RUN WrH LAND" ch. 4 (2d ed. 1947).
81 Today the sale and use of land and the financing thereof resemble other com-
mercial transactions more and more. Bookstaver, Book Review, 12 J. LEG. ED. 150 (1959).
82 As originally adopted in 1938, the provision was the same except that the future
tense was used: "Unless a lease of real property shall expressly otherwise provide, a
rejection of such lease or of any covenant therein by the trustee of the lessor shall
not deprive the lessee of his estate." 52 Stat. 840 (1938).
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the right of possession at a fair rental to the end of the term? If the
lease is unrecorded but the lessee is in possession, is his estate protected
against the trustee? To what extent, if at all, does the lessor provision
apply under chapters X to XIII of the Bankruptcy Act?
In applying the lessor provision in straight bankruptcy, the court
reconciles the conflicting interests of the unsecured creditors and of the
lessee. Such creditors want the maximum assets available for distribution
to them; the lessee wants to continue in possession under his original
lease. The unsecured creditors will want the trustee to reject the lease,
if the premises can be sold for a better price free and clear of the lease,
as, for instance, when the prospective purchaser of the freehold is pre-
pared to occupy the premises himself or lease them at a higher rental.
But the lessor provision stands in the way, guaranteeing that a rejection
"does not deprive the lessee of his estate." Clearly, the policy of this
provision is to favor the lessee over the unsecured creditors. Yet the
careful lawyer still fears that in some circumstances a court of bankruptcy
would allow rejection at least in part, such as rejection of those of the
lessor's covenants that do not run with the land. This is the heart of the
problem of the lessor provision.
Did the lessor provision grant to the lessee rights not accorded by the
preexistent case law? Most of the cases before the Chandler Act involved
receivership rather than bankruptcy, but the principle is the same. In
Coy v. Title Guar. & Trust Co.,8 3 the receiver of the lessor was permitted
to reject an executory lease for a barber shop and public bath in an
office building, since the lease was burdensome to the estate and would
reduce the sale value of the building. In American Brake Shoe Co. v.
New York Rys.,8 4 the receiver applied for permission to reject a lease of
an office building, contending that it would be burdensome to perform
covenants requiring the lessor to furnish heat, electricity, etc. The
court declared that ordinarily a court of equity should not allow
disaffirmance
merely because the corporate lessor made what, at this moment,
might be a bad bargain, although a good enough bargain
originally. It is the duty of the receiver to make every proper
effort to increase the assets of an estate, but not at the expense
of fundamental principles of fair dealing. When a lessee under
a lease takes possession, the lease presupposes continuance, even
in the face of a receivership of the landlord, so long as the
landlord's receivership estate is not burdened or put to loss, and
by "burdened" is not meant that the lease could be more profit-
83 198 Fed. 275 (D. Ore. 1912).
84 278 Fed. 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1922).
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able, but that it entails a positive loss or encroachment on the
corpus or capital of the estate.8 5
The court went on to say, however, that the trustee could later apply
for rejection if performance should become burdensome. Although this
court upheld the lessee's rights, it indicated that it would allow outright
rejection if conditions should change. Thus the court seems to con-
template only two possibilities-either complete enforcement or com-
plete rejection. Is there a middle road? Why not permit the lessee to
remain in possession on condition that he pay higher rent or assume the
cost of the utilities?8 6
Additional support for the lessee appears in an early New Jersey
decision.87 The court allowed a preferred claim for damages against a
receiver who had rejected an agreement to rent space for a soda fountain
in an office building. The court said that the receiver took possession of
the lessor's estate "cum onere, subject to the contract of letting entered
into by the [lessor]." The opinion indicates that the court would likewise
have granted specific performance to the lessee. Commentators have also
advocated preserving the leasehold against the trustee.8 8 It seems clear,
however, that prior to the Chandler Act, the few cases were so conflicting
that in most jurisdictions the lessee had little if any assurance that he
would be protected upon bankruptcy or receivership of the lessor. In a
variety of situations short of straight bankruptcy, the lessee did find him-
self without assurances of protection of his leasehold. For example,
where the assets were insufficient to pay any creditor ranking below the
first mortgagee, the court approved a plan of reorganization under
former section 77B that required rejection of a lease subordinate to the
mortgage. The court ruled that "the lien of the lease arises to no greater
dignity than a second mortgage on the premises." 89 It is the prevailing
American view that a purchaser of real property at a mortgage fore-
closure sale can reject a lease subordinate to the mortgage if the lessee
was a party in the foreclosure suit.90 And a lessor who rightfully termi-
85 Id. at 843.
88 See the text in the paragraph following note 109 infra.
87 Bolles v. Cresent Drug & Chem. Co., 53 N.J. Eq. 614, 32 Ad. 1061 (1895); cf. In re
Hays, Foster & Ward Co., 117 Fed. 879, 884 (W.D. Ky. 1902) (dictum about rights of
lessee against purchaser of freehold).
88 FINLEITER, BANKRUPTCY REORGANIZATION 240 (1939); Payne, The General Ad-
ministration of Equity Receiverships of Corporations, 31 YALE L.J. 685 (1922).
89 In re Hotel Governor Clinton, Inc., 96 F.2d 50, 52 (2d Cir. 1938); cf. In re
Banner, 149 Fed. 936 (S.D.N.Y. 1907). For comment justifying the Governor Clinton
decision, see Note, 48 YALE L.J. 1415, 1420 (1939).
90 TiFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 153 (3d ed. 1939); Annot., 14 A.L.R. 664 (1921).
In some states, such as Pennsylvania, the same rule applies even if the lessee is not
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nates a lease may likewise revoke a sublease, even though the sublessee
is willing to step into the shoes of the lessee and perform all his covenants
to the lessor.91
Professor MacLachlan, in 1927, recognized the insecurity of the lessee
and proposed that section 70 of the Bankruptcy Act be amended by
adding the following sentence:
The bankruptcy of a landlord, however, shall not work a
forfeiture of a tenant's estate and shall give the tenant's trustee
in bankruptcy no election to terminate the estate.92
Later, Professor MacLachlan said that this proposal was the source of
the 1938 version of the present lessor provision.93 It thus seems an
inescapable conclusion that the lessor provision was intended to grant
the lessee protection that the existing law either failed to provide dearly
or failed to provide at all.
What is the content of the new protection afforded the lessee? What
is the lessee's "estate" that the trustee may not take away by rejection?
made a party. Farmers' & Mechanics' Bank v. Ege, 9 Watts 436 (Pa. 1840). Professor
Tefft argues persuasively that a lease ought not be disturbed unless the mortgagee's
security cannot be preserved in any other way. Tefit, Receivers and Leases Subordinate
to the Mortgage, 2 U. CH. L. REV. 3, 35-36 (1934). This is the rule in England, but
is only a minority rule in the United States.
91 Brock v. Desmond & Co., 154 Ala. 634, 45 So. 665 (1908); Bush v. Bourland,
206 Ark. 275, 174 S.W.2d 936 (1943); Herman v. Campbell, 86 Cal. App. 2d 762, 195
P.2d 801 (1948); Hawley Corp. v. West Va. Broadcasting Corp., 120 W. Va. 184, 197
S.E. 628 (1938). Cf. Cohen v. Sylvan Lawrence Co., 166 A.2d 919 (Munic. Ct. App. D.C.
1961) (sublessee could not recover security deposit from successor of sublessor, who had
defaulted on head lease); Kerr v. Capital Grocery, Ltd., [1951] 1 West Weekly R. (Sask.)
1221, 59 D.L.R. 588 (1920) (assignment for benefit of creditors). But see Shaw v. Creedon,
135 N.J. Eq. 397, 52 A.2d 721 (1945). The traditional concept is that a sublease falls
with the head lease, like the branch of a tree that is cut down. Since under the
American Bankruptcy Act the courts apply the state law of landlord and tenant,
the usual result upon the bankruptcy of the head lessee is that either the
head lessor or the trustee may reject the sublease. In the English Bankruptcy Act this
old rule has been modified so as to permit the underlessee (as he is called in England)
or the mortgagee of the leasehold to obtain an order vesting the lessee's estate in himself
if he will assume the lessee's obligations to the lessor, or in the alternative if the under-
lessee or mortgagee will assume the obligations of an assignee of the interest of the
head lessee. Bankruptcy Act, 1914, 4 & 5 Geo. 5, c. 59, § 54(6); see notes 45-47 supra
and accompanying text.
92 McLaughlin, Amendment of the Bankruptcy Act, 40 HARv. L. Rav. 583, 605-06.
He said at 609: "The lease will not ordinarily involve heavy burdens on the landlord
such as that of making extensive repairs. If it does, the trustee of the landlord ought
to be able to repudiate such obligations and the bankrupt landlord ought to be free
of them and the tenant remitted to proof of claim in bankruptcy. However, it would
be going unreasonably far to provide that the bankruptcy of a landlord forfeits the
tenant's estate unless the trustees and the tenant agree to carry on . ... "
93 Interview with Prof. MacLachlan March 10, 1958. He also stated that he had taken
the idea from the English Bankruptcy Act.
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The content of the lessee's estate is usually a matter of state law. This
is because a court of bankruptcy applies the property law of the state
where the leased premises are located. This rule is dictated by a widely
accepted principle of conflict of laws rather than a specific provision of
the Bankruptcy Act or other federal statute.9 4 In applying state law,
the federal court of bankruptcy must choose between two possible
meanings of the lessee's "estate"; one meaning is broad, the other narrow.
Under the broad meaning, the content of the lessee's "estate" is clear.
According to the Bankruptcy Act, the trustee is "vested by operation of
law with the title of the bankrupt ... ."95 When this provision is read
in pari materia with the lessor provision, the former seems to say that
the trustee succeeds to precisely the same benefits and burdens under
the lease as the lessor himself had before bankruptcy. The transfer is
like a devolution to the lessor's heirs upon his death. This is not an
ordinary commercial assignment. The lessee is entitled to have the
trustee perform every covenant in his lease except, of course, a personal
covenant that only the lessor himself could perform-for instance, a
covenant not to compete in the same locality. If the lessor's trustee is
forbidden to reject any covenant in the lease, he must sell the freehold
subject to the lease; and according to general principles of property law,
the purchaser must recognize the real covenants of the lease as being in
full force and effect. 96 In re New York Investors Mut. Group, Inc.,97 the
sole reported case that applies section 70b to a lessor bankruptcy, seems
to support the broad understanding of "estate." The bankrupt lessor
owned a valuable corner in Manhattan. In 1914, the property was leased
for twenty-one years. In 1935, the original lease was renewed for twenty-
one years. In 1953, the lessee assigned its interest to East Netherland
Holding Company. The 1914 lease and the 1953 assignment were
recorded, but the 1935 renewal was not recorded at the time the lessor
was thrown into involuntary bankruptcy in 1955. The 1935 renewal
provided that at the end of the term, the lessor must either renew the
lease or purchase the lessee's improvements of the premises. Three
buildings had been erected at the time of bankruptcy. The trustee filed a
motion asking leave to sell the property free and clear of the lease and to
limit the lessee to the standing of an unsecured creditor as to the value
of the buildings; this motion was in effect a motion to reject the lease,
or at least to reject the covenant requiring renewal or purchase. The
94 GooDIcn, CONFLICT OF LAws § 148 (3d ed. 1949). This rule was not affected
by the decision in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
95 Bankruptcy Act § 70(a), 30 Stat. 565 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 110(a) (1958).
96 32 AM. JUR. Landlord & Tenant § 97, at 106 (1941).
97 153 F. Supp. 772 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
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trustee asserted that the word "estate" in the lessor provision of section
70b meant only the right to remain in possession for the unexpired term
of the lease-seven months. The court overruled this contention, saying:
The right of the tenant "not to be compelled to surrender the
premises until such payment [for the value of the buildings] be
made or tendered" was part of the "estate" granted to the
tenant and was a covenant which was not destroyed by the
trustee's notice of rejection.
A tenant's right to possession of land constitutes part of the
"estate" granted to him. [Citing a New York decision.] The
strict interpretation of "estate," as urged by the trustee, so as to
make it co-terminous with the 21-year period notwithstanding
that the landlord failed to make payment for the buildings
contrary to the covenant in the lease, denudes the lease of the
clear purpose intended by the parties and deprives the tenant of
the full enjoyment of his estate .... 98
On appeal by the trustee and an intervening mortgage creditor, the
court of appeals affirmed,9 9 emphasizing that even though the 1935
renewal was unrecorded, common creditors had constructive notice
because the lessee was in possession.
Despite the district court's broad interpretation of the lessor provision,
language in the opinion suggests a narrower concept of the lessee's
estate. (The court of appeals did not consider this point.) According to
this narrow interpretation, the transfer of the lease from the lessor to
the trustee should be treated like any other assignment of an estate in
land. Therefore, only covenants that run with the land are binding upon
the trustee or his vendee. Supporting this interpretation is the following
passage, which appears shortly after the passage quoted above:
The New York law on the subject is dear, First, a covenant
by the landlord to pay a tenant the value of the buildings upon
the expiration of the lease is a covenant running with the land.
Second, where the parties expressly agree a tenant is entitled to
possession until actual payment is made, he has a lien until the
payment is made. It is only where there is no express or dearly
implied provision for a lien to secure the payment for the
improvements upon expiration of the lease, that the lessor's
liability is only for money damages .... 100
The necessary implication is that if the covenants did not run with
98 Id. at 775.
99 Cohen v. East Netherland Holding Co., 258 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1958).
100 In re New York Investors' Mut. Group, Inc., 153 F. Supp. 775 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (cita-
tions omitted).
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the land, but were merely personal to the lessor, then the lessee could
not prevent rejection. The decisions of the several states are in conflict
as to which of the lessor's covenants run with the land.1 01
Although the result in the New York Investors case would have been
the same under either concept of the nature of the assignment to the
trustee, in other cases the result would depend on which concept the
court chose to apply. If the narrow interpretation is used-that the
assignment includes only covenants that run with the land-then
another problem arises. In the American Brake Shoe case,102 the court
refused to permit outright rejection of the lease but said the receiver
could later apply for permission to discontinue providing utilities if
this should become onerous. In the Coy case,'03 the court allowed the
receiver to reject a covenant to renew. Payne,104 and later Finletter,105
apparently interpreted these cases as drawing a distinction between real
and personal covenants: Only the personal covenants are rejectable.
But the author submits that Congress intended to change this rule
when it enacted the lessor provision in 1938. Another commentator
asserts that under section 70b, the trustee of a lessor would have to leave
the lessee in possession but could reject the rent provision of the lease.10 6
This restrictive interpretation would oppress the lessee because the
amount of rent is usually one of the chief terms of his bargain.
Could a court of bankruptcy refuse to apply state law, under which an
important covenant was personal and hence rejectable, and instead
enforce the covenant? In Local Loan Co. v. Hunt,107 the Supreme Court
ruled that the bankruptcy principle of assuring the debtor a discharge
was paramount to Illinois law, which recognized an assignment of
future wages. As MacLachlan says in commenting on this decision,
The law of property and of contracts will be followed in the
ordinary case without even arousing consciousness of any lurk-
101 Clark, REAL COVENANTS & OTHER INTERESTS WHICH "RUN WITH LAND" 96-100
(2d ed. 1947); 3 THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY 407-11 (Grimes ed. 1959). See also GOODRICH,
op. cit. supra note 94, at § 150.
102 Note 84 supra.
103 Note 83 supra.
104 The General Administration of Equity Receiverships of Corporations, 31 YALE
L.J. 685, 693-95 (1922). He also suggests that the possession of the tenant must remain
intact because this right is no longer executory, but all covenants prescribing executory
duties of the lessor may be rejected, such as a covenant to renew.
105 BANr.uPTCY REORGANIZATION 240 (1939).
106 Garrett, Lease Provisions Against Special Contingencies, 1952 ILL. L. FORUM
395, 404. Garrett suggests that the lessee's estate may be separated into an estate in
land and the contractual rights, the latter subject to rejection.
107 292 U.S. 234 (1934).
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ing questions, but the state law will not be followed with
reference to minority doctrines or tortuous concepts which
defeat the basic purposes of the national legislation. 108
To apply a tortuous or minority rule of state law in considering the
covenant personal would frustrate the purpose of the lessor provision,
just as the Illinois law frustrated an important bankruptcy purpose in
the Local Loan case. Of course, a knowledgeable attorney for the lessee
can include in the lease a provision that the covenant to renew shall be
deemed to run with the land. But rarely does the lessee or his attorney
consider the possible bankruptcy of the lessor. Indeed, most leases are
drawn by the lessor anyway, and what lessor will contemplate his own
bankruptcy and put in a provision to protect the lessee? Admittedly, if
the court applies the Local Loan doctrine so as to forestall rejection of
onerous covenants that do not run with the land under state law, this
will prevent a possible increase in the lessor's estate available for general
creditors. But is this an asset that the general creditors should have?
No doubt they have extended credit to the bankrupt in reliance, inter
alia, upon his ownership of real estate which they might reasonably
have assumed was leased upon favorable terms. But should they be able
to rely upon the possibility of rejecting an unfavorable covenant? If
the lease is of record, the answer is clear. The creditors have constructive
notice of the lease. They have no rights in bankruptcy as against the
lessee. If the lease is not of record but the lessee is in possession, the
creditors may have constructive notice.109 If the lease is not of record
and the lessee is not in possession, then the policy of protecting the
lessee's estate collides with another bankruptcy policy-the policy
against secret liens and preferences. Although it might be argued that
other provisions of the Bankruptcy Act were enacted to protect general
creditors, the lessee here should have no rights as against the common
creditors, hence rejection is proper.
Still another aspect of the meaning of the lessee's "estate" remains to
be explored. If the narrow interpretation is accepted and the state law of
covenants running with the land is not a "minority doctrine or tortuous
concept," then the Local Loan rule would not apply. Thus, the trustee
could assert a right to reject the bankrupt's personal covenants with the
lessee, i.e., those covenants defined by state law as not running with the
land. Should the court allow outright rejection of an option to renew the
lease? A provision on the amount of rent? An agreement to supply
108 MAcLAcHLAN, BANKRUPTCY 108 (1956).
109 Cohen v. East Netherland Holding Co., 258 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1958). Compare
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 9-402, 9-302, 9-303 (financing statement without details
as to specific chattels is constructive notice).
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utilities? Would not rejection of such covenants take from the lessee vital
portions of his contract if not his estate? The lessee wants performance
of the personal covenants as well as the real. But the common creditors
want the trustee to reject all personal covenants if the lessor's estate is
more valuable without them. Perhaps the best solution is a middle way,
taking account of the competing equities of both sides. Suppose the lessor
is a corporation that owns a shopping center and the lessee operates a
men's clothing store there. The premises are a storeroom renting at
500 dollars a month with two years remaining under the lease at the
time of bankruptcy. The lessee has an option to renew for five years at
600 dollars a month. The lessor has also covenanted to provide heat,
light, water, air conditioning and trash disposal, and to repair the outside
of the building. Another covenant binds the lessor not to lease to
another men's clothing store elsewhere in the shopping center. Suppose
further that none of these covenants run with the land under applicable
state law and that the court has decided that the Local Loan doctrine
does not apply. If the sales volume of the shopping center is rapidly
increasing, the trustee wants to reject all the covenants so that the center
can be sold free and clear of the obligation of the lease. In this example,
the fairest solution would be a middle road between complete per-
formance of the personal covenants and complete rejection. Perhaps a
satisfactory new lease could be negotiated by the trustee and the lessee.
Failing this, the court might decree that the trustee or his assignee
perform all covenants of the lease on condition that the lessee pay a
larger rent sufficient to cover increased costs of operation by the lessor.
This solution-a rewriting of the rent covenant-may be compared with
the flexible rent provisions included in some modern leases. 110
Does a court of bankruptcy have the power to allow the trustee to
rewrite the rent provision of the lease without a specific statutory
authorization? The court does have such power, for two reasons: (1) If
the court may allow the trustee to reject all of the personal covenants of
the lease, a fortiori the court may allow him to reject only one or two of
them; (2) This power is similar to or included in the broad powers
provided in chapters X to XIII for scaling down of creditors' rights,
which in turn derive from the broad powers exercised by the federal
courts in equity receiverships before enactment of the amendments of
the 1930's. 11 This middle-road formula has the advantage of preserving
what are usually the most important provisions of the lessee's bargain,
110 See Denz, Lease Conditions Designed to Meet Changing Economic Conditions,
1952 IL. L. FORUM 344, for a compilation of the various possible provisions.
111 See FiNLErrE, CORPORATE REORGANIZATION (1937); Payne, The General Ad-
ministration of Equity Receiverships of Corporations, 31 YALE L.J. 685 (1922).
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while at the same time recovering for the general creditors at least that
part of the enhancement in rental value resulting from higher costs for
insurance, utilities, taxes and maintenance, rather than any improvements
made by the lessor. The lessee would still have the benefit of any increase
in rental value because of such factors as inflation and population
growth.
If a mortgage ranks ahead of the lease, the foregoing analysis would
still apply. Where the property is worth more than the mortgage,
according to the official appraisal in bankruptcy, the trustee can either
sell the property subject to the mortgage or sell free and clear of the
mortgage, using the proceeds to pay off the mortgagee. In neither event
could the mortgagee reject the lease, since he would be paid in full.1 12
The trustee or his assignee would have no more right to reject the lease
than he would have absent the mortgage.
If the property is worth less than the mortgage, the trustee may either
abandon the property to the mortgagee or sell it and pay the proceeds
to the mortgagee, leaving him to file a claim as a common creditor for
the balance due. If the property is abandoned to the mortgagee and he
forecloses and sells the property, the purchaser could in most states
reject the lease, especially if the lessee were made a party to the foreclosure
suit. This would apply even if the mortgagee himself bought at the
sale. If the trustee sells the property instead of abandoning it, the vendee
would have the same rights as a vendee at a foreclosure sale. Thus,
where the lease is subordinate to the mortgage and the mortgage is of
greater value than the freehold, the lessee faces the expensive prospect of
either losing his lease, purchasing the reversion or purchasing the mort-
gage. What can the lawyer for the lessee do to prevent this when the
lease is first drafted? (1) He can insert a provision that all covenants
shall be deemed to run with the land. (2) He can ask for a provision
that in event of insolvency of the landlord, including bankruptcy, the
lessee shall have an option to purchase the reversion, the price either
being stated or made readily ascertainable. It may also be possible for
the lessee's attorney to get the mortgagee to agree that the mortgage is
subordinate to the lease.
To sum up, the broad interpretation of the lessor provision of section
70b is the correct one. None of the lessor's covenants may be rejected,
whether real or personal. Nevertheless, if the narrow interpretation is
accepted-that the personal covenants may be rejected-then the rule
is subject to two limitations. (1) Where the applicable state law is an
unusual law out of keeping with the policy of the lessor provision, the
112 See text accompanying note 90 supra for the power of the mortgagee to reject
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state law need not be followed. (2) A readjustment of the rent term of
the lease or other comparable terms is preferable to outright rejection.
It should make no difference if there is a mortgage superior to the lease.
It remains to consider the application of the lessor provision in re-
organizations and arrangements under chapters X to XIII. In a reor-
ganization or arrangement, the objectives are similar but not identical
to those in straight bankruptcy. The debtor usually has some voice in
the management of the estate in a reorganization or arrangement, but
he has none in bankruptcy. Although all of the different proceedings
under the Bankruptcy Act are intended to benefit creditors as much as
possible, the theory of a reorganization or arrangement is that the
creditors, by making a sacrifice now, will recover more later. But in
straight bankruptcy, the creditors expect prompt liquidation and dis-
tribution. Just how do these somewhat different objectives in reorganiza-
tion and arrangement proceedings affect the application of the lessor
provision? Should the tenant's leasehold have less protection when the
landlord's estate is being rehabilitated than when it is being liquidated?
The legislative history offers no guidance. The Chandler Act, which
first added chapters X to XIII to the Bankruptcy Act,"13 did not include
any lessor provision. Each of these chapters, however, contains a provision
incorporating the provisions of chapters I to VII "insofar as they are
not inconsistent or in conflict with the provisions of this chapter .... ,,114
Although the reports of the congressional committees do comment on
section 70b and related sections in other chapters, 1 5 these reports do
not touch the lessor provision.
In proceedings under chapters X to XIII, the common creditors always,
and often secured creditors, are asked to accept an extension of time for
payment, a reduction of amount, a diminution of security or a combina-
tion of these. The incorporation in chapters X to XIII of the provisions
of chapters I to VII in effect constitutes a presumption that the usual
bankruptcy provisions shall operate unless inconsistent with the purposes
of the later chapters. 10 Is it inconsistent with the provisions of chapters
113 The Bankruptcy Act formerly contained much less elaborate provisions for
compositions. See Bankruptcy Act § 12, 30 Stat. 549 (1898), § 74 added by Act of 1933,
47 Stat. 1467, as amended, 11 U.S.C. §§ 30, 202 (1934).
14 52 Stat. 883, 905, 916, 930 (1898), 11 U.S.C. §§ 502, 702, 802, 1002 (1958).
115 H.R. RE. No. 1409, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 34 (1937); S. RE. No. 1916, 75th
Cong., 3d Sess. 18 (1938). See also HOUSE CoMM. ON JuicrARY, 74th CONs., 2D SESS.,
ANALYSIS OF H.R. 12889, 227 (Comm. Print 1936).
116 Bankruptcy Act §§ 236, 376, 481, 666, 52 Stat. 899, 912, 924, 936 (1938), 11 U.S.C.
§§ 636, 776, 881, 1066 (1958). Although one might not ordinarily think of a wage earner
as a landlord, chapter XIII does allow rejection of executory contracts, including
unexpired leases. 52 Stat. 930, 933, 934 (1938), 11 U.S.C. §§ 1006(5), 1042, 1046(6) (1958).
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X to XIII to assure the lessee as great security in his leasehold in reorgan-
ization as he enjoys in straight bankruptcy? In a commercial bankruptcy
the creditors are usually businessmen who are accustomed to assuming
the risk of bad accounts as part of their cost of operation. In the non-
commercial bankruptcy, the creditors are typically retailers, finance
companies, hospitals or doctors, most of whom can protect themselves
through, for instance, credit reports, co-signers or chattel security. The
lessee of the bankrupt stands in a different position: He has not furnished
the bankrupt with goods or services on credit. Although theoretically
the lessee can protect himself against the lessor's insolvency, he usually
is not protected, especially if the lessor draws the lease. What has been
said about commercial bankruptcy applies to proceedings under chapters
X to XII, and the comment about non-commercial bankruptcy applies
to chapter XIII. It is inappropriate and unfair to subject the lessee to
any more alteration of his lease under chapters X to XIII than in
straight bankruptcy. One concludes that vis- -vis common creditors and
those holding chattel security, the lessee's estate should be preserved
the same as in straight bankruptcy. The lessor provision of section 70b
should be read into chapters X to XIII to this extent.
But what about the standing of a lessee vis-h-vis the holder of a
mortgage on the freehold? If the mortgage is subordinate to the lease,
the conclusion just stated should apply. But if the mortgage is superior
to the lease and if the plan of arrangement requires the mortgage creditor
to accept an extension, reduction or diminution of security, to accord
the lessee the same rights as in straight bankruptcy would be to prefer
him over the mortgagee. Any impairment of the rights of the mortgagee
enhances the value of the subordinate leasehold. It follows that if the
mortgagee should foreclose and sell the freehold, the purchaser could
reject the lease. Therefore, in a proceeding under chapters X to XIII,
a plan that reduces the rights of the mortgagee may properly require a
commensurate alteration of the lease. For example, if the mortgagee
agrees to a lower rate of interest and a longer period of repayment, the
lessee could properly be required to pay more rent or assume the
responsibility to pay for utilities. In altering the terms of the lease, the
court should take into account such factors as the time remaining under
the lease, the cost of removal to another location, good will, investment
in fixtures and conformity by the lessee to building, zoning and health
regulations. If the plan of reorganization or arrangement does not
require the superior mortgagee to alter his rights, and if the freehold is
worth more than the mortgage, then the lessee ought not be required to
accept any alteration. In reorganization, as in straight bankruptcy, if the
amount of the mortgage equals or exceeds the appraised value of the
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freehold and if the trustee retains the property rather than abandoning
it to the mortgagee, then the lien of the subordinate lease has little or no
value. Here, it would be proper to require the lessee to accept some
alteration of the lease. Thus, in chapters X to XIII, the leasehold should
ordinarily be preserved the same as in straight bankruptcy with two
exceptions-(l) where a prior mortgage is altered, and (2) where a prior
mortgage is left intact but the lessor's estate has no equity in the freehold.
Only In re Freeman,"" a chapter XII proceeding filed by a husband
and wife individually and as partners in a business, has specifically
considered whether the lessor provision of section 70b applies to
chapters X to XIII. The trustee sought to reject a lease, subordinate to
a mortgage, on a residence owned by the husband that had less than a
year to run. The trustee showed that on foreclosure and sale the property
would not yield any surplus for the husband's estate. A purchaser offered
to pay. 750 dollars for the property and to assume the mortgage if the
burden of the lease could be lifted. The tenant had been given an
opportunity to purchase the property but had not done so. He objected to
the rejection, arguing that the lessor provision of section 70b applied in
chapter XII. The court allowed the trustee to reject the lease on two
grounds: (I) The lessor provision did not apply because it is inconsistent
with the purposes of chapter XII;1"s (2) The tenant had no special
equities in his favor. The court thought recovery of 750 dollars for the
husband's estate was more important than preservation of the leasehold,
since the 750 dollars swelled the assets of the estate and presumably
helped persuade the creditors to accept the plan of arrangement. The
result seems correct when one considers that the leasehold had no value,
if treated as a lien subordinate to the mortgage. Yet, if the leasehold had
no value, where did the 750 dollars differential come from? This figure
can be at least partly explained as court costs, legal fees, and the general
shrinkage in value that usually accompanies a forced sale. Also it was
hard to find housing in 1943 because of the war, so a buyer might well
pay a premium for immediate possession as distinguished from possession
at the end of the lease or after a foreclosure proceeding. Furthermore,
property often has two prices-one for all cash and a higher price if the
117 49 F. Supp. 163 (S.D. Ga. 1943).
118 "To give to the word 'estate' as used in § 110, sub b [the U.S.C. number for
§ 70b] of Chapter VII the meaning petitioner suggests, viz., a right to continue to
occupy the premises until the end of the term, renders the section authorizing rejection
of executory contracts impotent to accomplish the ends for which it was designed.
To give it that meaning creates inconsistency and conflict with the purposes of the
Arrangement provisions, and where that happens Chapters I to VII are expressly made
inapplicable .... Id. at 165.
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buyer assumes (or obtains) a mortgage.119 Similarly, a property may have
a different value with and without a lease even though the lease is
profitable, since it restricts the purchaser from using the property him-
self. It is this difference in value that may properly be claimed for
creditors in chapters X to XIII where, because of a prior encumbrance,
the leasehold has no value.
The second reason suggested in Freeman-that the tenant had no
special equities in his favor such as a commercial tenant might have had
-indicates that the court might have denied rejection if the tenant had
had such equities as loss of good will, loss of investment in fixtures and
expense of removal. It was proper for the court to employ this technique
of weighing the equities of the tenant and of the common creditors where
the lien of the leasehold had little or no value. This corresponds to the
provision of the British Bankruptcy Act permitting the court to impose
such conditions as it thinks just upon the granting of leave to disclaim a
lease.120
The Freeman decision was correct, but it does not stand for the
broad proposition that the lessor provision is limited to straight bank-
ruptcy. All that Freeman holds is that where (1) the lease is subordinate
to the mortgage, (2) the leasehold has little or no value and (8) the
tenant presents no special equities, rejection is proper. Thus limited,
Freeman is good law. It would be persuasive in proceedings under
chapters X, XI, and XIII as well as XII.
In corporate reorganizations under chapter X, one special rule applies.
If the debtor leases property to a municipal transit authority or other
public agency, rejection is not permitted regardless of how desirable it
might be.121
IV. LESSEE IN BANKRUPTCY OR REORGANIZATION
When a lessee under an unexpired lease becomes bankrupt, his trustee
can reject the lease without any limitation such as that obtaining in
lessor bankruptcy. 2 2 No statutory provision guarantees the lessor his
estate. But there are other limitations on the trustee. He must reject or
affirm within the time period prescribed in section 70b, otherwise the
lease is deemed to be rejected. Uncertainties did develop as to the time
119 See Riley v. District of Columbia Redev. Land Agency, 246 F.2d 641 (D.C. Cir.
1957).
120 Bankruptcy Act, 1914, 4 & 5 Geo. 5, c. 59, § 54(3).
121 Bankruptcy Act § 116(1), 52 Stat. 885 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 516 (1958). See note 76
supra.
122 See 4 CoLLmR, BANKRUPTCY 70.44 (14th ed. 1942, 1959 Supp.); Roeder, Landlords,
Bankruptcy and 77B, 23 CoRNLL L.Q. 285 (1938); Stanley, Leasehold Rights in Bank-
ruptcy and Equity Proceedings, 29 Ky. L.J. 301 (1941).
1964)
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
period under the 1938 Act, but these have been corrected by the 1962
amendment sponsored by the National Bankruptcy Conference. 123
Section 70b also requires the trustee to file a statement with the court
showing which contracts and leases are executory and which he intends
to reject. If he fails to do this, he may cause a loss to the estate, because
of automatic rejection of favorable contracts. 124
It is not dear to what extent section 70b applies in reorganizations and
arrangements under chapters X to XIII so far as the lessor is concerned.
Often a lessor requires a provision that bankruptcy of the lessee shall
automatically terminate the lease.125 This kind of provision has usually
123 As amended, the first four sentences of § 70b provide as follows: "The trustee
shall assume or reject an executory contract, including an unexpired lease of real
property, within sixty days after the adjudication or within thirty days after the
qualification of the trustee, whichever is later, but the court may for cause shown extend
or reduce the time. Any such contract or lease not assumed or rejected within that
time shall be deemed to be rejected. If a trustee is not appointed, any such contract or
lease shall be deemed to be rejected within thirty days after the date of the order
directing that a trustee be not appointed. A trustee shall file, within sixty days after
adjudication or within thirty days after he has qualified, whichever is later, unless the
court for cause shown extends or reduces the time, a statement under oath showing
which, if any, of the contracts of the bankrupt are executory in whole or in part,
including unexpired leases of real property, and which, if any, have been rejected
by the trustee." 11 U.S.C. § 110(b) (Supp. IV, 1963) (Emphasis added to indicate 1962
additions.) By way of explanation of the amendment to § 70b, S. REP. No. 1954, 87th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1962), said: "This language [prior to amendment] does not give due
regard to the contingency that in many instances the trustee may not have been
appointed within 6 days after the adjudication or, alternatively, that his appointment
may be so close to the expiration of the 60-day period that he has inadequate time to
come to a considered decision concerning the assumption or rejection of executory
contracts. Moreover, the present language fails to give the due regard to the fact that
there may be cases in which no trustee is appointed. The new language in section 70b
covers this contingency as well." For problems under the former act, see Rickles,
Claims Arising From Breach of Executory Contracts, 26 REF. J. 21 (1952).
124 In re Gravure Paper & Board Corp., 234 F.2d 928 (3d Cir. 1956) (sale of lease at
public auction more than sixty days after adjudication did not prevent automatic
termination); In re Northern Ind. Oil Co., 180 F.2d 669 (7th Cir. 1950); United States
v. Chichester, 312 F.2d 275 (9th Cir. 1963); In re Forgee Metal Prods., Inc., 229 F.2d 799
(3d Cir. 1956) (conditional sale contract); cf. In re Pagliaro, 99 F. Supp. 548 (N.D. Cal.
1951) affd sub nom. Costello v. Golden, 196 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir. 1952) (conditional sale
contract in which bankrupt had valuable equity); In re Public Ledger, Inc., 63 F. Supp.
1008 (E.D. Pa. 1945) (labor contract). The American statute makes no provision for
property unknown to the trustee, but the English statute provides that the time
period runs from the time of discovery. Bankruptcy Act, 1914, 4 & 5 Geo. 5, c. 59,
§ 354(1).
125 The sixth sentence of § 70b, 52 Stat. 880 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 110(b)
(Supp. IV, 1963), provides as follows: "A general covenant or condition in a lease that
it shall not be assigned shall not be construed to prevent the trustee from assuming
the same at his election and subsequently assigning the same; but an express covenant
that an assignment by operation of law or the bankruptcy of a specified party thereto
or of either party shall terminate the lease or give the other party an election to
terminate the same is enforceable."
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been held to apply to reorganizations and arrangements as well as
straight bankruptcy, 126 but it would be better if the statute said so
explicitly since the question is still open in most jurisdictions. Another
problem is whether the time limits on the trustee apply to the other
chapters. Nothing in the legislative history of either the 1938 Act or
the 1962 amendment sheds any light on this question. 2 7 Moreover, the
court decisions are in conflict on the question. But the better considered
decisions hold that the time limitations of section 70b do not apply to
chapter X since the objective is rehabilitation of the debtor rather than
liquidation. 28 It is said that the time limit of section 70b is in conflict
with section 116(1), which authorizes rejection of executory contracts
without time limit, thus giving the trustee greater freedom of action. 2 9
Although the trustee in reorganization is not subject to the time limits
of section 70b, he is subject to other requirements. Contracts in the public
authority may not be rejected in a chapter X proceeding.130 A plan of
reorganization for a public utility must be approved by the appropriate
state commission.' 8 ' In deciding whether to reject a lease, the trustee
must also reckon with the rule that under chapters X to XII, the lessor
may prove a claim for as much as three years' rent' 32 as opposed to
one year in straight bankruptcy. 13 3 Finally, there is some authority that
126 Smith v. Hoboken R.R., Warehouse & S.5. Connecting Co., 328 U.S. 123 (1946)
(§ 77); Finn v. Meighan, 325 U.S. 300, 840 (1945) (ch. X); Ghoti Estates v. Freda's
Capri Restaurant, 332 Mass. 17, 123 N.E.2d 232 (1954) (provision for bankruptcy or
receivership held to cover ch. XI arrangement). Contra, In re Burke, 76 F. Supp. 5
(S.D. Cal. 1948) (provision for bankruptcy or general assignment does not cover ch. XI).
127 The original proposal of the National Bankruptcy Conference included a pro-
vision that would have excluded § 70b from applying to the other chapters, HANNA
8. McLACHLAN, THE BANKRUPTCY Acr 109 (6th ed. 1957). These provisions were evidently
eliminated later as being too controversial.
128 Title Ins. & Guar. Co. v. Hart, 160 F.2d 961 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S.
761 (1947); In re M & S Amusement Enterprises, Inc., 122 F. Supp. 364 (D. Del. 1954)
(debtor in possession under ch. X); In re Childs Co., 64 F. Supp. 282 (S.D.N.Y. 1944);
In re Rochester Shipbuilding Corp., 32 F. Supp. 98 (W.D.N.Y. 1940). But cf. In re
Forgee Metal Prods., Inc., 229 F.2d 799 (3d Cir. 1956) (court assumed without discus-
sion that sixty-day limit applies in ch. X, but held that trustee rejected contract by
failing to notify other party).
129 Title Ins. & Guar. Co. v. Hart, 160 F.2d 961, 965 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S.
761 (1947); cf. In re M 9- S Amusement Enterprises, Inc., 122 F. Supp. 354 (D. Del.
1954); In re Childs Co., 64 F. Supp. 282 (S.D.N.Y. 1944). See text accompanying notes
113-16 supra.
130.Bankruptcy Act § 116(1), 52 Stat. 885 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 516(1) (1958). See note
76 supra.
131 Bankruptcy Act §§ 177, 178, 52 Stat. 891 (1938), 11 U.S.C. §§ 577, 578 (1958).
132 Bankruptcy Act §§ 202, 353, 458, 52 Stat. 893, 910, 921 (1938), 11 U.S.C. §§ 602, 753,
858 (1958).
'33 Bankruptcy Act § 63a(9), 52 Stat. 873 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 103(a)(9) (1958). See
Gleick, Rent Claims and Security Deposits in Bankruptcy, 18 Mo. L. REv. 1 (1953), also
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rejection in a plan of reorganization' 34 must satisfy a test of good busi-
ness judgment. This test has been most fully expounded in a railroad
reorganization case.13 5 No court has held that the business judgment
test applies in reorganizations under chapter X, but there is some support
for this view in both America 136 and England. 37 Such a test is desirable
as a check upon arbitrary or unwise rejection by a trustee, yet it allows
him considerable latitude.
V. CONCLUSION
The major point of uncertainty in the law of rejection is the meaning
of the lessor provision in section 70b of the Bankruptcy Act. Congress
should clarify this provision by adding a sentence stating that it applies
to all real and personal covenants as defined by state law. This is the
broad interpretation of the present clause. As a less desirable alternative
providing somewhat less protection to lessees, the amendment should
provide that the lessee is to have the benefit of all real covenants and
that if the lease is to be rejected, the court should make appropriate
orders protecting the lessee who has made valuable improvements to
the premises.3 8 If the lessee is to continue in possession, the modification
appearing in 58 Com. L.J. 181 (1953), 27 REF. J. 43 (1953); Newman, Rent Claims in
Bankruptcy and Corporate Reorganization, 43 CoLum. L. REv. 317 (1943).
134 It will be recalled that under chapters X to XIII the trustee has two chances to
reject, once at the beginning and again in the plan of reorganization or arrangement.
Bankruptcy Act §§ 116(1), 216(4), 313(1), 357(2), 413(1), 461(4), 613(1), 646(6), 52 Stat.
885, 895, 906, 910, 917, 921, 931, 934 (1938), 11 U.S.C. §§ 516(1), 616(4), 713(1), 757(2),
813(1), 861(4), 1013(1), 1046(6) (1958). See text at note 28 supra.
185 Group of Institutional Investors v. Chicago, M., St. P. & Pac. R.R., 318 U.S. 523,
549-51 (1943). The test is the business judgment of the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion, as limited by the public interest in railroad service. For application of this test in
the former reorganization of the New Haven Railroad, see Palmer v. Webster & Atlas
Nat'l Bank, 312 U.S. 156 (1941); Old Colony Bondholders v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R.,
161 F.2d 413 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 859 (1947); Badenhausen v. Guaranty
Trust Co., 145 F.2d 40 (2d Cir. 1945) (sections five and seven of opinion); In re New
York, N.H. & H.R.R., 54 F. Supp. 595, 619, 621-28 (D. Conn. 1943); New York,
N.H. & H.R.R. Reorganization, 261 I.C.C. 195 (1945).
136 Harrigan v. Gilchrist, 121 Wis. 127, 352-53, 99 N.W. 909, 978 (1904) (receivership
-contracts of manufacturer);o6 CouL.m, BANKRUPTcY 685 (Moore & Oglebay eds. 1947).
137 In re Newdigate Colliery, Ltd, [1912] 1 Ch. 468 (court forbade receiver to reject
contracts for delivery of coal because, inter alia, this would injure the good will of the
business); cf. In re Thames Ironworks, Shipbuilding & Eng'r Co., Weekly N. 66 (Ch.
1912) (receiver could properly reject contract to build ships because debtor could not
possibly have any equity in the proceeds); In re Great Cobar, Ltd., [1915] 1 Ch. 682
(receiver was permitted to disaffirm contract establishing sole agents since this would
not affect good will).
138 The British act authorizes the court to "make such orders with respect to
fixtures, tenant's improvements, and to other matters arising out of the tenancy, as
the court thinks just." Bankruptcy Act, 1914, 4 & 5 Geo. 5, c. 59, § 54(3).
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of the terms of his lease should be commensurate with the treatment of
secured creditors rather than common creditors.
Two other matters ought to be clarified by amendment to the Bank-
ruptcy Act. Protection should be afforded the sublessee who is willing
to assume the obligations of the head lessee upon that party's bank-
ruptcy.3 0 And Congress should specifically provide that the time limits
of section 70b do not apply to proceedings under chapters X to XIII.
These three amendments would resolve most of the present uncer-
tainties in the law. Until they are enacted, however, the prudent attorney
for a lessee would do well to insert language in the lease to protect the
lessee in event of bankruptcy or reorganization of the lessor.
139 See the British Act, supra note 138, § 54(6).
